This is another writing sample I for the same job application as the other post from a couple days ago. It kind of was the seed for my longer research paper for a senior seminar at Bowdoin.
Corruption and
perceptions of corruption have changed drastically in recent Chinese
history. The economic reform beginning
in the late 1970's marked a turning point in perceptions of corruption in
China. Before the reform, corruption (the
use of official connections for personal gain) was seen as less problematic; however,
Xi's anticorruption campaign has demonstrated the fact that public opinion on
corruption has changed a great deal since reform.[1] With the state's recent crackdown, meaningful
criticism of corruption has become legitimized by the party. The kind of corruption that Xi is targeting
plays an important role in steering public opinion. Instead of focusing on petty corruption at
lower levels of government, Xi has targeted high level officials who are making
significant amounts of money purely for their own personal gain. Although Xi's targeting of top politicians
like Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang is a thinly veiled attempt at consolidation of
power, it sends the message that everyone, regardless of rank, might be
targeted.[2] The fact that Xi has targeted these higher
level officials also serves to increase his popularity among the common people,
who see him as a protector of their own interests.
Perceptions of
corruption everywhere in China have changed across time, but they have changed in
different ways across the country.
Public opinion varies a great deal from region to region, especially
between more developed and less developed areas of China. Generally, populations in more rural and
underdeveloped regions perceive more corruption in their own communities, while
those in more developed and urban areas perceive less corruption in their own
areas. Before the reform, corruption, or
the use of official connections for personal gain was seen as less problematic. Under Mao, economy was so stagnated that it
was understood that in order to acquire certain goods, some kind of network or
connection with people in power was necessary for obtaining basic goods. Lack of demarcation between public and
private property in an era of strongly communist discourse made corruption more
difficult to pin down.[3] In the years following the economic reform,
private enterprise began growing at ever-increasing rates. Officials began to realize that they could
profit substantially by using their influence to help certain private
enterprises. As private enterprise grew,
so did official corruption, to the point that officials were becoming
enormously rich at the expense of fair competition between enterprises.
Today,
experts' understanding of corruption shows some definite trends in regional
variation in perceptions of corruption. A
study of 1,637 economics and management professors found a strong link between
level of development and perceived corruption.
In an assessment of perceived corruption in major cities across the
country, with 1 indicating high levels of corruption and 7 indicating very
clean cities, 3.8 was the average.
Shanghai was the cleanest, scoring a 5.025, followed close behind by
other developed cities along the eastern coast.[4] It isn't exactly clear why more economic
experts perceived developed cities as less corrupt, but I would posit a couple
of hypotheses. First, it may simply be
that, as was seen during the Mao era, when local economies are less developed
(people are poorer, there is less credit to be loaned out, etc.) they are
forced to use connections with government officials in order gain any
capital. Second, it may be that the
kinds of corruption simply differ in these two types of locality, such that
corruption in developed regions is less visible and/or less common (this is not
to say it is less in degree. For
example, ten township officials in a rural area may all receive 1,000 RMB in
exchange for publicly backing a certain village head candidate. At the same time, a part secretary of a
provincial level city, may receive a gift valued at 10,000 RMB from a business
contact, simply to foster good relation.
One example is likely more visible, while the other is less easily
detected).
Generally,
these experts tended to be optimistic regarding progress in curbing corruption
in China. Over half believed that
corruption problems were improving in their locality, while a third saw no change
in recent years.[5] But Xi's anticorruption campaign can only go
so far in curbing corruption. The
campaign has been successful in punishing high-profile politicians, reclaiming large
amounts of assets, and likely has deterred some further high-level
corruption. But informal institutions
such as patronage networks still play a hugely important structural role in
local economies, and these institutions prevent fair competition between
enterprise and the development of formal institutions such as intellectual
property rights and legal recourse for breaches of legal contracts. The expert respondents found that the sectors
of society crucial for the development of these formal institutions were
actually among the most corrupt sectors in society. The police ranked as the third most corrupt
sector, while the courts ranked fifth.[6] By its very nature, Xi's campaign avoids
these institutional problems, and reinforces and legitimizes a highly
centralized system of justice that is governed not by law, but by the inevitably
biased decisions of certain top officials.
[1] Wang,
Shunzhu. "Anticorruption, Power Struggle, and Rule of Law in China: Random
Thoughts on Xi Jinping's 'Tiger-Killing' Anticorruption Campaign." Corruption
and Governmental Legitimacy: A Twenty-first Century Perspective. By
Jonathan Mendilow and Ilan Peleg. Lanham: Lexington, 2016. 275-85. Print, 278.
[2] Ibid., 280.
[3] Ibid., 278.
[4] Song,
Xuguang, and Wenhao Cheng. "Perception of Corruption in 36 Major Chinese
Cities: Based on Survey of 1,642 Experts." Social Indicators
Research 109.2 (2011): 211-21. Web, 216.
[5] Ibid., 215.
[6] Ibid., 217.
No comments:
Post a Comment